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1. Introduction 
 
The more rapid growth of some industrialized nations is, in part, the result of an 
effective complementary role for government in providing the domestic economy with an 
adequate technology base as well as broad and rapid utilization of this base (Tassey, 
1991).  
While European Union (EU) scientific and technological institutions show levels of 
research productivity comparable with North America’s ones, their contribution to the 
competitiveness of the European industry lags quite behind. The reason lies in the EU 
weak integration between public research institutions (PRIsi) and industry (Ben-David, 
1977), as compared to North America’s (Geiger, 1988; Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994; 
Stokes, 1997). Only at the end of the 80s, induced by a strong anxiety about EU 
competitiveness in science-based industries, EU and, at different levels, EU single 
member states have emphasized the importance of academic technology transfer (Lowe, 
1993, Peterson e Sharp, 1998). Not only have the United States and Canada become 
aware of the importance of the integration of the two systems long before the EU, but 
they have acted accordingly with an impressive rapid pace. In 1980 approximately 20 US 
universities only had a technology licensing office (TLO); by 1990 the number was 200, 
and by 2000 nearly every major research university had one (Colyvas et al., 2002). The 
Licensing Survey: Fiscal Year 2003 of 2004, by the American Association of University 
Technology Managers, shows that since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, the 
number of patents filed yearly by North American PRIs has increased more than tenfold 
and, at the same time, there was also an increase in the number of patents transferred to 
industry. Before the Bayh-Dole Act, 5% only of US PRIs patents were licensed to 
industry (Mowery and Sampat, 2005). Currently, about 60% of US PRIs patents is 
licensed out or optioned, of which 65% to small companies (with fewer than 500 
employees) or spin-offs. 374 spin-offs were created, 79% of which in the region where 
the underlying technology was developed. At the same time, income from licensing has 
grown almost tenfold since 1991. 
                                                          
1 Abramo, G. (2006). The Technology Transfer of the Italian Public Research System: the Case of the 
National Research Council of Italy. International Journal of Technology Transfer and 
Commercialization, 5(4), 338-354. DOI: 10.1504/IJTTC.2006.013342 
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This very rapid patenting, licensing and revenue growth rates, has led few scholars to 
investigate whether the surge of commercialization activities has fundamentally changed 
the nature of US academia for the worse. One of the first concerns addressed was 
whether an emphasis on the commercialization of knowledge assets might entail the risk 
of tipping the research balance from lower to higher patent-intensive sectors and from 
fundamental to applied research. This prospect, however, was denied by empirical 
evidence by Mowery et al., 2001 and Thursby and Thursby, 2002. Nelson, 2004, 
observed that uncontrolled patenting and exclusive licensing might be 
counterproductive for research itself: knowledge usually follows gradual developmental 
patterns, and patenting intermediate findings or tools useful in following stages of the 
research process can slow down the advancement of knowledge and technologies, 
especially in the area of fundamental research. Washburn, 2005, analyzed a number of 
cases of negative externalities associated with indiscriminate patenting and 
opportunistic licensing behavior by US universities. While this US introspection is 
underway many industrialized countries are changing their university and legal systems 
and making substantial financial investments to emulate the environment that Bayh-
Dole seems has created. Actually, Mowery and Sampat, 2005, recently stated that much 
of the growth in licensing and university “spinoffs” that has occurred since the passage 
of the Bayh-Dole Act almost certainly would have occurred in the absence of this piece 
of legislation, because of the long-standing and relatively close relationship between US 
universities and industrial innovation. They go further to question whether the emulation 
of the Bayh-Dole Act, occurring in a number of Oecd (Organization for economic co-
operation and development) countries, is sufficient or even necessary to stimulate higher 
levels of technology transfer. Instead, reforms to enhance inter-institutional competition 
and autonomy within national university systems appear to be more important. 
While a higher and higher number of EU countries continue to strive to emulate US 
success in harnessing the intellectual output of its academic institutions, Italy still seems 
to lag behind, in terms of both relevant actions and performances 
A recent report on firms’ innovativeness by the Italian Statistics Institute, Istat (2003), 
shows that Italian companies which had introduced product or process innovations in the 
period 1998-2000, rank PRIs last among ten different sources of information for the 
innovations introduced. As for the technology transfer performances of Italian PRIs, very 
little can be found in the literature. The very few empirical analyses tend to concentrate 
on scientific output (publications) of Italian PRIs research activity (Bonaccorsi and 
Daraio 2002, Orsenigo 2002). However, indicators of scientific production, such as 
scientific papers, citations, impact factor, etc. if on the one hand may result useful 
towards the appraisal of the quality and efficiency of research systems, on the other have 
little significance with regard to the evaluation of the impact of public research on 
domestic industry’s competitiveness. While scientific papers play a significant role as a 
source of information for companies’ innovative activities they hold little potential as 
sources of firms’ competitive advantage, because of the “public” essence of this way of 
encoding knowledge. Studies on Italian PRIs patent outputs, are rather limited. Important 
exceptions are Piccaluga and Patrono (2001) and Balconi et al. (2003) that analyze Italian 
PRIs patents filed at the European (EPO) and American (USPTO) patent offices. 
Piccaluga et al. (2002), extend the empirical analysis by comparing with France and 
Spain. Baldini et al. (2003) delve into the effects of institutional changes on the patenting 
activities of Italian universities. Abramo (1998) was the first one to engage in the analysis 
of licensing performance, although limited to the Italian Research Council (Cnr), the main 
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public research institution in the country. Recently, Abramo and Pugini (2005) extended 
the licensing investigation to the academic system. The paucity of empirical studies 
reveals, on one side, the little attention to the problem at different levels, political and 
institutional first of all; and on the other, a great difficulty in acquiring the relevant data 
for appropriate elaboration. 
This paper will analyse the patenting and licensing activities of the Italian Research 
Council from 1996 to 2001ii. A benchmarking of Cnr main performance indicators is then 
conducted vis-à-vis the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Mit) for the period 1999-
2001. Finally, through a time series analysis based on a previous study from the same 
author (Abramo, 1998), a drop in patenting performance will be pointed out, followed by 
the identification of its main determinants. The purpose of the study is twofold: i) to 
provide a complete picture of how commercialization activities of Italian PRIs stand vis-
à-vis the best practices; and ii) to identify the likely determinants of low performances, 
which may provide practical implications for Italian policy makers with respect to how to 
foster technology transfer.  
The articulation of the article is as follows. Section 2 will deal with how PRIs can 
contribute to industry competitiveness through technology transfer. Section 3 will 
analyze Cnr technology transfer. Section 4 will contrast it with Mit. Section 5 will 
present a Cnr performance time series analysis. Finally, section 6 will provide a 
discussion of the main determinants of the findings. 
 
2.  Assessing the capability of the public research system to sustain domestic 
industry’s competitiveness. 
  
 The generic purpose of PRIs is to sustain national competitiveness and socio-
economic development, through the advancement of science and technology progress. 
The appropriate indicators and their relative importance to assess the pursuing of this 
purpose descend directly from the development policy of the government (in general, 
customer benefits, net production investments and new jobsiii induced by the utilization of 
public R&D outputs by industry, but also specific sectorial or regional development, etc.). 
 It is possible to disaggregate the process by which public R&D leads to socio-
economic development into its three major stages: R&D by PRIs, technology transfer 
from PRIs to industry and technology exploitation by industry. Then, the efficiency of the 
public technology infrastructure, or the social return to public R&D investment, is timely 
measurable in terms of: i) R&D productivity, i.e. R&D output divided by R&D 
investment; ii) technology transfer productivity, i.e. R&D output actually transferred to 
the production system divided by total R&D output (speed of technology transfer and 
amplitude of diffusion are other indicators of technology transfer efficiency); and iii) 
transferred technology yield, i.e. social benefits as defined above divided by transferred 
R&D outputs. 
 The problem is to identify appropriate indicators of R&D output which have direct 
linkages to industry competitiveness. We know that competitive advantage at business 
level is based on the so called “distinctive competences”, that is firm’s strategic resources 
which, in addition to being superior to those of competitors’, are also difficult to imitate, 
transfer and substitute. As a consequence, in order for the public R&D output to be able 
to induce distinctive competences within domestic companies, it is not enough that 
knowledge advances be superior to those produced by other national research 
infrastructures, but also that: i) the mode in which new knowledge is encoded be such to 
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be difficult to imitate or transfer without the owner’s will, and ii) the properly encoded 
new knowledge be actually transferred to industry. 
 The mode of encoding new knowledge most apt to create competitive advantage is 
then intellectual property protection, i.e. patent and the like. Actually, tacit knowledge 
and trade secrets, which may be transferred through consulting or training, are other 
important sources of competitive advantage as well. Scientific papers, because of their 
public nature, are not a source of competitive advantage. Furthermore, because it has been 
shown that large companies recur to scientific literature as a source of information much 
more than small companies (Cohen et al., 2002), those countries whose industry structure 
is characterized mainly by large companies (which is not the case of Italy) benefit more 
than others from scientific papers. 
 The simple formula that I apply to measure the effectiveness of a public research 
system in sustaining domestic industry competitiveness and socio-economic development 
is then: 
 
D&RD&R Inv
SB
L
SB
P
L
Inv
P
investmentD&RtoturnRe   
 
Where P represents the number of patents and the like generated by the R&D 
investment, InvR&D; L is the number of patents licensed out; and SB represents the social 
benefits (customer benefits, net production investments and new jobs, etc.) induced by the 
exploitation of the licenses by industry. 
 Examining returns in terms of the above three factors, namely R&D productivity, 
technology transfer productivity and socio-economic yield, has organizational 
advantages too. R&D productivity is determined largely by the efficiency of the R&D 
labs. Similarly, technology transfer productivity is determined largely by the efficiency 
of the technology transfer office (i.e. the marketing and sale function of the 
organization). Socio-economic yield, on the other hand, in addition to the innovation 
potential, is largely dependant on industry structure. Actually, the measurement of the 
first two factors, whose product is named “quantitative return to R&D investment”, may 
be sufficient to appraise the relative efficiency of public research systems in sustaining 
domestic industry competitiveness. 
 This methodology and the relevant formula are by no means exhaustive and not 
intended to pursue an accurate quantitative measure of socio-economic returns to public 
R&D investments. In fact, only patent and patent license are considered as indicators of, 
respectively, R&D output and technology transfer. Moreover, the yield factor is not easy 
to measure because of the intrinsic difficulty of identifying all innovation externalities 
and quantifying social benefits. Although patent-based indicators are probably the most 
frequently used measure of technology output, one should bear in mind a few 
drawbacks: first, institutional differences, distinct appropriability strategies, and 
different propensity to patent across sectors may bias the international comparisons. 
Second, the value distribution of patents is very skewed, with many patents having no 
industrial application and few patents very high returns. Third, changes in patent laws 
make it difficult to analyze long run time trends. Last but not least, patent indicators are 
constructed on the basis of applications filed at national patent offices, having different 
examination procedures and an ”home advantage” bias. 
Nevertheless, this methodology can be a powerful managerial tool to benchmark 
national technology systems, as the following analysis hopefully will show. 
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3. The case of the National Research Council of Italy 
 
With an R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP of 1,16%, Italy ranks 22
nd
 
among the 30 Oecd countries. However, because of its comparatively high GDP, Italy 
ranks 8
th
 in the world in terms of gross domestic expenditure on R&D. The 
comparison of R&D expenditure by source of funds and sector of execution shows that 
Italy has the highest percentages among G7 countries: 50.8% of R&D is funded by the 
public sector and 51% is executed at PRIs. The average figure of G7 is around 30%. 
Italian research scientists result very productive but, much more than their foreign 
colleagues, they tend to encode new knowledge in the form of publications rather than 
patents. From 1995 to 2000, Italy scored a record annual publication growth rate among 
G7 countries, which has now resulted in the second (after UK) highest number of 
publications per researcher (Oecd, 2004). Conversely, patent applications by universities 
remain relatively scarce, as the whole of Italian universities file as few patents as the 
university of Wisconsin alone. Even if all other government research laboratories are 
counted in, the total number of PRIs filed patents stays below the Mit alone. The gap in 
patent intensity, then, is alarming: in 2002, patent intensity of Italian universities 
amounted to merely 4 patents per 1,000 researchers, as against 22 in the UK, and over 
40 in the US as early as in 1999 (Abramo and Pugini, 2005). 
To complete the picture and try to better understand the causes of the scant 
entrepreneurship attitude of Italian PRIs an analysis of the patenting and licensing 
activities of the Italian Research Council has been carried out. 
What is Cnr? It is the main public research institution in Italy in terms of size, budget, 
geographical coverage and research spectrum. Cnr promotes, co-ordinates and carries out 
research in almost all fields of science, through its over 100 research institutesiv, with a 
staff of approximately 8,000 of whom 4,000 are research scientists. In addition, in order 
to favor the transfer of its research outputs in 1980 a Cnr technology licensing office was 
set up.  
Why is Cnr an appropriate benchmark to represent Italian PRIs in international 
comparisons? Not only is Cnr the largest public research institution in the country (12% 
of total R%D expenditure), above all it shows the largest patent portfolio and patent 
intensity among PRIs in the period 1982-2001, owning 59% of all EPO and USPTO 
patents filed by the whole Italian public research system, i.e. 9 times as many as Italian 
universities altogetherv (Piccaluga and Patrono, 2001). Comparing then the largest and 
most productive public research institution in the country with a leading American 
research university, Mit, will provide a good perspective of where the Italian public 
research system stands vis-à-vis one of the world leaders. 
 
3.1. Cnr productivity analysis 
 In the period 1996-2001, Cnr average yearly research expenditure was € 747.51 
million at constant prices 2001 (table 1). 76% of the total expenditure, i.e. € 566.55 
million was allocated to institutional research activities carried out at Cnr Institutes; 13%, 
i.e. € 94,05 million, was allocated to the so called “Targeted Projects”vi (TPs); and the 
remaining 12%, i.e. € 86.92 million, to general expenses including buildings, training, 
and technology transfer. In the same period, Cnr filed 257 patentsvii, i.e. 43 patents per 
year on average. 21% of all patents stemmed from TPs. 67% of all patents was filed in 
Italy; 26% was PCTviii, 4% was USPTO only, 2% was EPO only, 4% was others. Cnr was 
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the exclusive owner of 77% of patents; 15% was jointly owned by Cnr and other PRIs; 
while 8% was jointly owned by Cnr and private companies.  
 R&D productivity in the period at stake was 5.71%, that is € 100 million R&D 
investment produced on average 5.71 patents. In particular, productivity within Targeted 
Projects was 8.62%, therefore above average, as could be expected: in fact TPs are more 
oriented towards applied and industrial research. Productivity within institutional research 
was 5.25%.  
 Table 2 shows the number of patents licensed every year to industry. The total number 
of patents licensed in the period under exam amounted to 50, which corresponds to a 
yearly average of 8.33. 6 out of them, i.e. 12% of all patents licensed out, were licensed 
abroad. Technology transfer productivity, i.e. the ratio of patents licensed out to patents 
filed in the period, was 19.46% (table 3). 16% of all patents licensed stemmed from TPs; 
while the remaining 84% from institutional research. Technology transfer productivity of 
TP patents was 14.55%, below average; while technology transfer productivity of patents 
arising from institutional research was 20.79%. This evidence is quite surprising. 
 Out of the 50 patents licensed in the period under exam, 42% was filed in Italy, 38% 
was PCT, 6% was EPO, and the remaining 14% was filed elsewhere. Technology transfer 
productivity of patents filed in Italy only was below average, 12.28%; while technology 
transfer productivity of PCT patents was 28.36%. This can be explained with the Cnr 
policy of extending patent protection abroad only if a potential licensee has formally 
shown interest in the extension. 
 As for the ownership, 78% of patents licensed belonged exclusively to Cnr; 10% was 
jointly owned by Cnr and other PRIs; and 12% was jointly owned by Cnr and industry. 
Technology transfer productivity of Cnr wholly owned patents was 19.70%; of Cnr-PRIs 
jointly owned patents was 12.82%; of Cnr-industry owned patents was 30%. Although 
this last finding is above average, it is quite surprising that 70% of patents filed by private 
companies jointly with Cnr were not exploited by the relevant companies. 
 A different measurement of technology transfer productivity may be obtained by the 
ratio of licensed patents to patent portfolio (i.e. licensable patents). In fact, every year it is 
possible to license not only inventions patented in that year, but also all previous years’ 
patents which have not been abandoned or exclusively licensed. Every year, on average, 
1.5% of Cnr patent portfolio is licensed out. The technology transfer productivity referred 
to patent portfolio depends, among other things, on how wisely the patent portfolio has 
been built up. On the one hand, a large portfolio enhances licensing-out probability; on 
the other hand, patents' renewal fees increase. The latter increases proportionally with the 
age of patents: the older the patent, the higher the yearly renewal fee. Furthermore, 
because of technological obsolescence, the licensing-out likelihood is a diminishing 
function of the age of patents.  
 Two other important indicators describe technology transfer effectiveness with regard 
to socio-economic development, namely diffusion of innovation and rate of technology 
transfer. The analysis of the distribution of non-exclusive licenses and exclusive licenses 
shows that out of 50 patents licensed out, 38 (76%) were granted as exclusive licenses. 
The remaining 12 patents gave rise to 40 non-exclusive licenses. Out of 78 overall 
licenses, 21 (27%) were granted abroad. As for the rate of technology transfer, the shorter 
the lag between patent filing and licensing, the higher the impact on competitiveness and 
socio-economic returns. In the period considered, 45% of licenses were granted within 
one year from filing; 84.2% within three years; and only 15.8% of licenses were granted 
after three years of filing. 
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 At this point it is possible to calculate the overall Cnr quantitative return to R&D 
investment, as the ratio of licensed patents to R&D expenditure, or the product of 
research productivity by technology transfer productivity. In the period 1996-2001 the 
average Cnr quantitative return to R&D investment was 1.12%, which means that € 100 
million R&D investment led to 1.12 inventions transferred to industry. 
 
4. Cross-section analysis 
 
 The previous section showed an apparent inertia of technology transfer from Cnr to 
industry. The question is whether this inertia is intrinsic or typical of the Italian system. 
To try to answer this question it has been carried out a benchmarking exercise between 
Cnr, i.e. the most productive (in terms of patents) PRI in Italy, and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (Mit), one of the top research universities in the US.  
Mit is an appropriate benchmark as it shows characteristics, pertinent to the subject of 
this study, similar to Cnr’s. Like Cnr, Mit carries out research in a number of disciplinary 
sectors and at different levels: basic, applied and technological research. It is similar in 
size: It employs around 7,800 employees, of which 1,500 are professors/lecturers and 
1,700 are researchers. Also, it has a yearly research budget very close to Cnr’s. 
Furthermore, like Cnr, Mit devotes a similar share of its R&D budgets to humanities and 
social research (sectors where research output is hardly encoded as patent). Finally, it has 
an internal Technology Licensing Office (TLO). The comparative analysis has been 
carried out for the period from 1999 to 2001. The relevant findings are shown in table 4. 
The Mit yearly average R&D budget in the period was € 735 million (at 2001 constant 
prices)ix, while Cnr’s was € 763 million. On average 151 Mit patentsx were issued yearly, 
and the Mit TLO licensed on average 89 patents per yearxi out of its overall patent 
portfolio. Mit average R&D productivity then, was 20.54%; while technology transfer 
productivity was 58,94%. In 2001, the average R&D productivity of North American 
PRIs was 19,25%, while technology transfer productivityxii was 59,57%. Cnr, instead, 
patented in the same period an average of 41 inventionsxiii per year and licensed on 
average 6.33 patents per year out of its patent portfolio. Cnr R&D research productivity 
was then 5.33%, while technology transfer productivity was 15.57%. Licenses considered 
here did not include trademarks and copyrightsxiv.  
In comparative terms then, Cnr patent output was 27% of Mit’s; while Cnr licensed 
out patents were only 7% of Mit’s. It is worth noting that up to 1985, Cnr patent output 
was higher than Mit. Comparing both institutions’ productivity indexes, it results that Cnr 
R&D productivity was around 26% of Mit which means that, R&D expenditures being 
equal, Cnr produced 26% of Mit patents. Cnr technology transfer productivity was also 
around 26% of Mit’s that is, the number of licensable patents being equal, the Cnr TLO 
was able to license out about 26% of patents which was able to license out the Mit TLO. 
By multiplying the above two factors it is possible to have a measurement of the 
quantitative return to R&D investment (number of licensed patents divided by R&D 
expenditures) and, therefore, an indication of the relative efficiency of the two research 
organizations. Mit showed an average return of 12.11%, which means that € 100 million 
R&D investment pours out 12.11 inventions into the production system. Instead, Cnr 
showed a return of 0.83%, which means that to pour out 8.3 inventions it takes € 1 
billion. In relative terms, R&D expenditures being equal, Cnr poured out only 6.85% of 
the inventions which Mit was able to generate and transfer. 
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With reference to a previous benchmark analysis of Abramo (1998), referred to year 
1994, the current findings show that Cnr R&D productivity as compared to Mit has 
declined to less than half; while relative Cnr technology transfer productivity has doubled. 
The overall relative Cnr quantitative return to R&D investments has declined by 1% with 
respect to 1994.  
Finally, as far as the socio-economic return to R&D investment is concerned, a study 
carried out in early 1995 by Pressman et al. estimated that Mit active, exclusive, patent 
license agreements had induced just under US$ 1 billion investments by the commercial 
sector toward the development and early commercialization of licensed inventions, and 
over 2,000 jobs had been created and/or sustained as a direct result of these licensesxv. 
This estimate was conservative as many licensees had not yet introduced the relevant 
products into the market: then, further development, production and marketing 
investments would be required. 
Assuming that analogous amounts of investment would be required on the Italian 
commercial sector toward the development and early commercialization of Cnr-licensed 
inventions, it is easy to have an order of magnitude of the amounts of investments and 
new jobs forgone because of Cnr lower technology R&D and technology transfer 
productivities (6.85% of Mit).  
At financial level, the Mit TLO showed average yearly revenues of € 46.61 million, 
and expenditures on patents of € 6.58 million. The Cnr TLO showed average yearly 
revenues of € 640,000 and expenditures on patents of € 390,000. Cnr TLO revenues 
represented 1.37% of Mit; while Cnr TLO profit margin was 0.62% of Mit. Mit TLO 
revenues showed a constant growth, representing in 2001 11% of Mit total R&D 
expenditures. A growing share of Mit TLO revenues derived from sale of Mit spin-off 
stakes. In the period 1999-2001 Mit created on average 23 spin offs yearly, while Cnr 
created its first 3 spin offs only in 2002. 
 
5. Time-series analysis 
 
 In order to evaluate the evolution of Cnr technology transfer performance a time-
series analysis of the main productivity indicators has been carried out. Findings of this 
investigation have been compared to those of a previous study of Abramo (1998) referred 
to the period 1989-1995. The time-series analysis is shown on table 5. 
The period 1996-2001 shows a contraction (-9%) of R&D expenditure with respect to 
the period 1989-1995, which confirms a trend: the period 1989-1995 witnessed itself a 
decrease (–7%) of R&D expenditure with respect to the period 1981-1988. The 
contraction of R&D expenditure hit above all Targeted Projects (-19%), and to a less 
extent Institutional Research (-8%). 
 Patent output decreased by 41%, passing from a yearly average of 73 patents in the 
period 1989-1995 to 43 in the later period. The major contraction regards patents 
stemming out of Targeted Projects (-74%), while the number of patents stemming out of 
Institutional R&D diminished by 13%. As to be expected, the number of patents jointly 
owned by Cnr and private companies passed from a yearly average of 8.5 in the period 
1989-1995 to 3.3 in the period 1996-2001 (-61%). 
 Since in the latter period patent output decreased more than R&D expenditure, R&D 
productivity worsened (-34%), passing from 8.85% in the former period to 5.85% in the 
latter one. In particular, Targeted Projects R&D productivity decreased by 67%, while 
Institutional Research productivity decreased by 7%. Although Targeted Project R&D 
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productivity was 1.6 times as high as Institutional R&D productivity, the proportion has 
considerably diminished with respect to the period 1981-1995, when it was 4.6 times as 
high. It is worth underlying that such decrease is not due to a growth of Institutional R&D 
productivity, which, as already said, diminished by 7%. 
 While patent output and R&D productivity diminished in the latter period, the number 
of patents licensed out slightly grew (+2%). As a consequence, technology transfer 
productivity considerably rose (+74%). In particular, technology transfer productivity 
concerning patents stemming out of Targeted Projects rose by 81%, while technology 
transfer productivity referred to Institutional R&D rose by 19%. Technology transfer 
productivity measured as the ratio of patents licensed out divided by the whole patent 
portfolio rose only by 11%. This is due to the fact the patent portfolio diminished (-7%) 
comparatively less than patents filed (-41%) in the later period. 
 The overall quantitative return on R&D investment rose by 13%, passing from 0.99 
patents licensed out per € 100 million R&D investment in the former period, to 1.12 in 
the latter period. 
 Few findings of the time-series analysis deserve to be delved into. First of all, the 
considerable drop of patent output in the latter period. This phenomenon can be the effect 
of essentially four causes: i) the drop of R&D expenditure; ii) the drop of the share of 
R&D funds devoted to Targeted Projects, which show the higher research productivity; 
iii) the shift of Targeted Projects to less “patent fertile” research fields; and iv) the new 
Cnr patent policy of 1995xvi, according to which the burden of patent expenses had been 
decentralized from corporate level to research Institutes and Targeted Projects, causing a 
competition within research centers in the allocation of scarcer and scarcer funds between 
research and patenting expenses. The drop of R&D expenditure (-9%) can explain only a 
part of the larger drop of patent output (-41%). Assuming constant return to scale along 
the relevant patent-R&D expenditure arch, the input drop could cause a patent output 
decrease of 9% at most. It must be noticed that to an analogous input drop in the period 
1989-1995 (-7%), it corresponded a raise of patent output of 4%. The impact of the lower 
share of funds devoted to Targeted Projects, which passed from 15.8% of total Cnr R&D 
expenditure to 14.2%, is evidently negligible. The main determinants of the output drop 
remain then the last two factors, whose relative weight is difficult to quantify. A 
comparative analysis of the areas of investigation of TPs showed, in fact, a shift in the 
latter period from the Pasteur and Edison quadrants to the Bohr quadrant (Stokes, 1997), 
i.e. from research that, be it basic or applied, had commercial application to areas less 
fertile in terms of patent output. The decentralization of resource allocation decisions 
from Cnr headquarters to research institutes, i.e. research scientists boards, inevitably 
penalized patenting investments vis-à-vis research expenditures, given the simultaneously 
scant patenting culture of Italian scientists and the growing hunger for research resources.  
Finally, although the number of patents filed has dropped, the number of patents 
transferred has slightly risen. This may be the effect of the “Darwin law” induced by the 
new above said patent policy, which led to a stricter selection process and a better quality 
of patented inventions, and/or an improved efficiency of the Cnr TLO. Both causes are 
plausible, although it must be noticed that 40% of patents licensed out in the period 1996-
2001 were filed before the introduction of the new patent policy, and that the technology 
transfer productivity referred to patent portfolio rose only by 11%. There may be also a 
diminishing return to scale effect (to an increase in the number licensable patents it 
corresponds an increase in the number of licenses less than proportional), as shown by 
Thursby and Thursby (2002) in the American case.  
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
 The foregoing analysis, far from being aimed at a quantitatively precise assessment of 
the technology transfer performance of that significant component of the Italian public 
technology infrastructure represented by Cnr, allows to appreciate the dimension of the 
gap with Mit and the US university system in general. A gap which extends even more 
remarkably to the whole Italian public research system, if one considers that Cnr 
technology transfer productivity is 46% higher than overall Italian universities (Abramo 
and Pugini, 2005). This gap can be considered neither negligible nor unnoticeable, 
notwithstanding assumptions, approximations and limitations that comparisons of this 
kind intrinsically embed.  
 The gap shows in both patenting and licensing dimensions of technology transfer. 
Furthermore, along the former dimension the Cnr time series analysis shows a worrisome 
drop in performance. How do we explain then such low patenting intensity? Is it just a 
matter of the higher quality of American research scientists as compared to Italians? This 
may indeed explain part of it, but if this holds entirely true how would we explain then 
the higher Italian research productivity in terms of publications per researcher? And when 
would that difference in quality have occurred, if till 1985 the number of Cnr patents was 
higher than Mit? Nor can the patenting gap be explained with different patent legislations 
in the two countries: they were substantially the same in the period under exam. The 
major determinants of such a huge gap are to be found somewhere else, in particular 
among cultural, strategic and organizational factors. The general tendency to favor 
scientific publication to patent as a mode to encode new knowledge is particularly strong 
among Italian public researchers, as shown by. Abramo and D’Angelo (2005). Policies 
and incentive systems adopted by PRIs to foster an entrepreneurial aptitude among their 
employees have revealed inappropriate or insufficient.  
 A for the low licensing performance, analysis of the causes is not an easy task, as a 
number of determinants and, above all, the synergistic effects of their interaction probably 
concur to determine this situation. Aside from a possible sociological cause, i.e. that Italy 
productive system is less inclined to taking risks and undergoing changes than US, a low 
demand by industry is to be excluded. In spite of comparatively low private investments 
on R&D, a demand for inventions by the Italian industry does exist indeed, as shown by 
the chronic and growing deficit of Italy technology balance of payments (Tbp), 
particularly for patents: from €270 million in 1998 to €550 million in 2003. A possible 
mismatch between public research supply and industrial demand is to be excluded as 
well. To verify this possibility the correlation between Cnr patents and the Italian Tbp has 
been measured. First, Cnr filed and licensed patents have been classified according to the 
Tbp standard classification codes. Then, a correlation analysis between filed and licensed 
patents with the Tbp in each industrial sector has been carried out. The correlation index 
between filed patents and Tbp (–0.42), shows a significant correlation between Cnr patent 
supply and industry demand. In other words, Cnr files more patents in those industrial 
sectors where the Tbp is more negative. Instead, the correlation index between Cnr 
patents licensed out and Tbp is –0.30, which shows a weak correlation between industry 
demand and acquisition of Italian patents. This means that Italian firms tend to satisfy 
their innovation needs more from abroad than from internal public supply. This finding is 
confirmed by a recent empirical survey among Italian PRIs by Abramo and D’Angelo 
(2005). For two thirds of the results with immediate industrial interest (72% of total 
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research output) derived from PRIs high-tech research, there are Italian companies 
potentially able to exploit them.  
While all the conditions seem to be there, technology transfer performance by 
patent licensing remains extremely poor. In his previous analysis of Cnr licensing 
activities over a 15-year period, Abramo, 1998, identifies in the technology transfer 
management policies and practices the main determinant of low performance. No major 
changes have occurred in the period under exam.  
 Differently from the US, where there is a long history of university-industry 
collaboration and technology transfer, Italy has always been characterized by 
comparatively weak links. Differently from the US, where the Government has enacted 
laws, such as the Stevenson-Wydler Act and the Bay-Dole Act, to further strengthen such 
links, in Italy most needed government intervention and consequent institutional building 
and vision have been quite lacking or insufficient. As a consequence, Italian PRIs 
policies, organization and management systems, especially incentive systems, are not 
sufficiently geared towards a strong integration with industry: very few Italian universities 
have a TLO, and the ones that have it do not usually show adequate capacity (both 
quantitative and qualitative) and recognition within the organization.  
 The Italian case shows that public research excellence is not sufficient to assure 
domestic industry competitiveness and socio-economic development. Making new 
knowledge available to domestic industry is as important as producing it. While the 
current debate tend to focus on the scarce resources devoted to R&D, much more 
attention should be paid on how make those investments more fruitful, by eliminating the 
public-to-private technology transfer bottleneck. 
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Table 1 - Cnr R&D expenditures (€ mln at constant prices 2001); patents filed; and R&D productivity. 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total Average % 
R&D expenditures 763,93 713,65 717,75 722,02 774,72 793,00 4485,07 747,51 100% 
Patents filed 38 30 46 42 39 62 257 42,83 100% 
Source:          
Institutional 
R&D 
30 25 39 34 30 44 202 33,67 79% 
Targeted 
projects 
8 5 7 8 9 18 55 9,17 21% 
Extension:          
Italy 25 21 33 26 20 46 171 28,50 67% 
Pct 10 7 13 14 12 11 67 11,17 26% 
Epo 2 0 0 1 3 0 6 1,00 2% 
Uspto 0 2 0 0 1 1 4 0,67 2% 
Others 1 0 0 2 3 3 9 1,50 4% 
Ownership:          
Cnr 30 27 33 28 30 50 198 33,00 77% 
Cnr and 
PRIs 
5 1 5 12 6 10 39 6,50 15% 
Cnr and 
Industry 
3 2 8 2 3 2 20 3,33 8% 
R&D productivity 4,97% 4,20% 6,41% 5,82% 5,03% 7,82%   5,71%   
Table 2 - Cnr patents filed and licensed out disaggregated according to source, extension and ownership - period 1996-2001. 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total Average % 
Patents filed 38 30 46 42 39 62 257 42,83 
 
Patents licensed out 12 5 10 5 11 7 50 8,33  
Source:          
Institutional R&D 9 4 9 5 9 6 42 7,00 84% 
Targeted projects 3 1 1 0 2 1 8 1,33 16% 
Extension:          
Italy 6 1 2 2 6 4 21 3,50 42% 
Pct 4 1 7 3 3 1 19 3,17 38% 
Epo 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 0,50 6% 
Usa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0% 
Others 2 2 1 0 1 1 7 1,40 14% 
Ownership:          
Cnr 11 4 6 2 10 6 39 6,50 78% 
Cnr and PRIs 0 0 4 0 0 1 5 0,83 10% 
Cnr and Industry 1 1 0 3 1 0 6 1,00 12% 
Licensing productivity 31,58% 16,67% 21,74% 11,90% 28,21% 11,29%  19,46%  
 Table 3 - Licensing productivity of Cnr patents disaggregated according to source, 
extension and ownership.  
Period 1996-2001 
Patents 
filed 
Patents 
licensed out 
Licensing 
productivity 
Patents filed 257 50 19,46% 
Source:    
Institutional R&D 202 42 20,79% 
Targeted projects 55 8 14,55% 
Extension:    
Italy 171 21 12,28% 
Pct 67 19 28,36% 
Epo 6 3 50,00% 
Usa 4 0 0,00% 
Others 9 7 77,78% 
Ownership:    
Cnr 198 39 19,70% 
Cnr and PRIs 39 5 12,82% 
Cnr and Industry 20 6 30,00% 
 
Table 4 - Research and licensing productivities comparative analysis Cnr-Mit 1999-2001 (monetary values expressed in 
million Euro at constant prices 2001). The “%” columns represent the ratio Cnr/Mit. 
  1999   2000   2001   Average  
 MIT CNR % MIT CNR % MIT CNR % MIT CNR % 
Research 
expenditure 
695,36 721,95 103,82% 746,00 775,11 103,90% 764,00 793,00 103,80% 735,12 763,35 103,84% 
Patented inventions* 143 34 23,78% 150 34 22,67% 160 54 33,75% 151 40,67 26,93% 
Research 
productivity 
20,56% 4,71% 22,90% 20,11% 4,39% 21,82% 20,94% 6,81% 32,52% 20,54% 5,33% 25,94% 
Patent licenses 87 4 4,60% 90 10 11,11% 90 5 5,56% 89,00 6,33 7,12% 
Licensing 
productivity 
60,84% 11,76% 19,34% 60,00% 29,41% 49,02% 56,25% 9,26% 16,46% 58,94% 15,57% 26,42% 
Quantitative return 
to R&D investment 
12,51% 0,55% 4,43% 12,06% 1,29% 10,69% 11,78% 0,63% 5,35% 12,11% 0,83% 6,85% 
Revenues  20,92 0,60 2,86% 35,14 0,64 1,81% 83,78 0,68 0,81% 46,61 0,64 1,37% 
Expenditures on 
patents 
6,20 0,42 6,81% 6,31 0,33 5,28% 7,24 0,41 5,66% 6,58 0,39 5,90% 
Gross margin 14,71 0,18 1,19% 28,84 0,30 1,05% 76,53 0,27 0,35% 40,03 0,25 0,62% 
*Only patents. Trademarks and copyrights are not counted 
 Table 5 - Time-series analysis of Cnr patenting and licensing activities in the periods 
1989-1995 and 1996-2001. 
 
 
Average 
1989-
1995 
Average 
1996-
2001 
Variation 
R&D expenditure (million Euro at 
constant prices 2001) 
824,51 747,51 -9% 
Targeted Projects 130,61 106,37 -19% 
Institutional R&D  693,90 641,14 -8% 
Patents filed  73 43 -41% 
Patents arisen from Targeted 
Projects 
34 9 -74% 
Patents arisen from Institutional 
R&D 
39 34 -13% 
R&D productivity 8,85% 5,85% -34% 
Targeted Projects productivity 26,03% 8,62% -67% 
Institutional R&D productivity 5,62% 5,25% -7% 
Patents licensed out 8,14 8,34 2% 
Licensing productivity 11,15% 19,40% 74% 
Targeted Projects licensing 
productivity 
8% 14,5% 81% 
Institutional R&D licensing 
productivity 
17,6% 21% 19% 
Patent portfolio 601 557 -7% 
Licensing productivity referred to patent 
portfolio 
1,35% 1,50% 11% 
Quantitative return to R&D investment 0,99% 1,12% 13% 
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i The acronym PRIs, public research institutions, refers to both universities and public research 
laboratories. 
ii On October 2001 a new law on patents was enacted in Italy, which gave PRIs employees exclusive rights 
on property and exploitation of their inventions. This new law substituted the previous one, dating back to 
1939, which closely resembled the Bayh-Dole Act. 
iii Why “net”? An invention transferred to industry may displace current technology. Therefore, the 
assessment of the invention’s socio-economic impact should take into account, in addition to the benefits 
for the innovator and the positive externalities occurring to other firms due to relevant knowledge and 
market spillovers, also the negative externalities for those firms whose technologies are made obsolete by 
the innovation. 
iv A recent re-organisation has aggregated a number of research labs, so the actual number in the period 
covered in the study was around 330. 
v Balconi et al. 2002, have shown indeed that the number of patents whose authors belong to academic 
staff is much higher than those owned by universities. Even accounting for this, Cnr patent productivity 
results higher than universities. 
vi Targeted Projects, which last five years, are research programmes jointly carried out by Cnr, other PRIs, 
and industry on topics reputed as strategic for the country. 
vii Unless otherwise specified, by patent it is meant all possible forms of intellectual property rights, such 
as trademarks, software copyrights, etc. 
viii One single Pct filing allows patent extension to over 100 member countries of the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty. The same holds true for the European Patent Office filing, as far as the European member 
countries are concerned. 
ix At purchasing parity power exchange rate of euro 0,9873 per dollar. 
x Trademarks and copyrights are not included. 
xi This figure is conservative, as it regards licenses. Few licences are non exclusive, involving the same 
patent; others involve more than one patent. The net balance actually shows a number of patents licensed 
out larger than the number of licenses, as stated by the director of Mit TLO. 
xii The numerator of the productivity indicator includes, in addition to licenses, also options by companies. 
Therefore, the result is overestimated. 
xiii Here too, trademarks and copyrights are not included. 
xiv For safe of completeness, in the period considered Mit granted 243 software end-use licenses; Cnr only 
4. 
xv That estimate does not include investment and jobs generated by non-exclusive patent agreements, or by 
no longer active exclusive patent license agreements, or by any type of copyright license agreement. 
xvi Cnr Executive Committee act n. 305 of May 4, 1995. 
